

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AND TERRORISM

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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Since before September 11, experts on Arab/Muslim affairs, on terrorism, and on international affairs in general have been writing on the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Arab/Muslim world. They differ on the most important factors behind the creation of Al Qaeda and other extremist Islamist networks, with some focusing on problems of Arab/Muslim culture and governance, and others on U.S. policies in the region and arrogance in dealing with Arab countries. During 2003 three major polling organizations conducted extensive surveys that shed considerable light on attitudes in the Arab and Islamic world and in other countries that are useful for examining some of the theories of the academics and pundits, and that merit further study for policy decisions. In my SRP I will analyze these arguments and attempt to draw conclusions about the most effective political/diplomatic strategy the U.S. can develop in order to eliminate or at least mitigate these sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism.

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IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AND TERRORISM

“WHY DO THEY HATE US?”

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought home to all Americans the fact that there are dangerous terrorist groups at work in the world, some with an intensely anti-American agenda. Public reaction was summed up in the question, “Why do they hate us?” The question may have been meant by some to refer only to the individuals who planned and executed the attacks, but to a certain extent it came to refer to the presumption that the U.S. was widely hated in the Arab and Muslim world, and that this hatred was the source of the terrorism inflicted upon the United States that day. Since the September 11 attacks, regional experts and pundits have discussed at length in journals, newspapers and the broadcast media their theories about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Arab and Muslim world. Based upon their theories, they make policy recommendations. Separately, a number of polling organizations have conducted surveys of opinion in the Arab and Muslim world, in order to provide some understanding of broader public opinion about the United States and the lives of the residents of those countries that could be useful to those attempting to understand the reasons for the September 11 attacks. Finally, U.S. policy actions and documents released since then, while focusing mainly on defeating the specific terrorist groups, implicitly agree that in order to stop terrorism, the U.S. must look for its sources, and address the problems that are presumed to give rise to terrorism. Among these have been public diplomacy campaigns to improve the image of the United States in the Muslim world, along with discussion of assistance programs to countries such as Afghanistan whose lack of development and stability made it easy sanctuary for terrorism. But while there has been some effort to put together the thinking by experts and pundits, the results of opinion polls, and strategies put forth by Administration officials, there are potential lessons to be learned from the polls in particular, especially when opinions in the Muslim and Arab world are compared to those in other regions. This paper will examine some of the most prominent theories by regional experts and pundits about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism, and the link between the two, and at three major opinion polls conducted in 2002 that shed light on public opinion about the issues, and attempt to draw conclusions about some of the theories based on the polls. Finally it will look at where current U.S. policy comes down on the issue, and make some suggestions about areas for consideration by policy makers regarding United States efforts to get to the sources of terrorism and anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world.

DIVIDED VIEWS AMONG PUNDITS AND ACADEMICS INFORMING U.S. POLICY

Since before September 11, regional experts have been attempting to explain the rise of anti-United States terrorist organizations in the region. In the process, most describe widespread criticism and antipathy toward the United States. While these observers differ considerably on those sources, they mostly agree that there is a direct and sometimes even causal link between anti-Americanism and terrorism.

For many, the issue was on the table long before September 11. At the time of the attacks, Bernard Lewis, a leading American scholar of the Middle East, was finalizing a book asking What Went Wrong? in the Arab and Islamic world.¹ Although he points out that the book was written just before the attacks, the way he frames his look at the Arab world presumes a link between what he sees as centuries long cultural, economic, and political decline in the Arab world and the terrorism that struck September 11. He emphasizes that the question is not just of interest to Westerners. "People in the Islamic world, especially but not exclusively in the Middle East," have been wondering why the Islamic world, once "in the forefront of human civilization and achievement,"² controlling vast swaths of territory, had lost so much power and prestige over the last several hundred years.

Lewis offers a long-term historical analysis of "what went wrong," reviewing what he sees as the cultural as well as political decline of the Arab/Islamic world since the 18th century. He describes efforts by Arabs and Muslims to understand how the West came to outstrip them in so many fields. He says the shocks of the 20th century—the establishment of the state of Israel and the rise of the Asian tigers—were seen as particularly disturbing affronts to the Arab/Muslim notion of theirs as a righteous religion and culture. He says many believe these affronts could only have come about as result of a grand conspiracy on the part of Islam's enemies, often seen as led by the United States. Lewis himself sees the sources of the Muslim world's problems in its treatment of women, lack of a notion of secular state, lack of "sense of time," and lack of real social equality. Lewis' view of an entire culture that has fallen behind as the rest of the world modernizes offers little prescription for combating anti-Americanism or terrorism.³ He sees the solution as totally in the hands of the Arabs themselves, saying "If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in a common creative endeavor, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own."⁴

In contrast, Arab activist and pollster James Zogby sees Arab anti-Americanism as mainly an angry reaction against specific U.S. policies in the region, particularly its support of Israel.⁵ Speaking on a “Meet the Press,” show about a Gallup Poll of attitudes in the Islamic World, Zogby disagreed with those who argue that Arab governments have manufactured negative opinions of the United States in order to deflect attention from themselves. He argued instead that these governments “are in trouble today because their relationship with the United States is as close as it is...” He said that the Palestinian issue is a “decisive question” in the region, and key to understanding anti-American sentiment. He called Al Qaeda a “death cult” and said the issue of terrorism “is totally separable from the issue of Palestine.” He argued that a link exists only in that anti-American sentiment over Palestine will hinder our efforts to build a coalition to defeat terrorism.⁶

Barry Rubin, Director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center and Editor of the Middle East Review, disagrees, and takes a harsh view of Arab governments, with a correspondingly harsh prescription for U.S. policy. He argued in “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” that Arab governments have “manufactured” anti-Americanism as a way to deflect popular anger at their own corrupt, autocratic governments.⁷ He disagrees with those who see U.S. policies in support of Israel and of unpopular regimes as the source of anti-Americanism. “Arab and Muslim hatred of the United States is not just, or even mainly, a response to actual U.S. policies—policies that, if anything, have been remarkable pro-Arab and pro-Muslim over the years. Rather, such animus is largely the product of self-interested manipulation by various groups within Arab society, groups that use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems within those societies.”⁸ He argues that the U.S. has had very pro-Arab policies in recent decades, and that it shored up traditionalist regimes as bulwarks against communism during the Cold War. “The basic reason for the prevalence of Arab anti-Americanism, then, is that it has been such a useful tool for radical rulers, revolutionary movements, and even moderate regimes to build domestic support and pursue regional goals with no significant costs.”⁹

He concedes there are “legitimate Arab and Muslim grievances against the United States,” but notes that other regions with similar or greater grievances have not spawned such violently anti-American terrorism.¹⁰ He argues that public diplomacy campaigns and attempts to “appease” the Arab world are misguided, because they project a weak image that extremists exploit. Although he asks twice “What should Washington do?” he offers little concrete policy advice. “Only when the systems that manufacture and encourage anti-Americanism fail,” he

says, “will popular opinion also change. In the interim, the most Washington can do is show the world that the United States is steadfast in support of its interests and allies.”¹¹

Thomas L. Friedman, the foreign affairs columnist for The New York Times, presented his views about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Arab and Islamic world in numerous columns in 2001 and 2002 (many of which were published in a collection in 2002).¹² Over time, he has focused heavily on what he sees as the hatred and jealousy of the terrorists and on what he sees as the responsibility of Arab regimes for creating climates in their countries that breed frustration and fostering anti-Americanism as a way to deflect popular criticism away from themselves.

He blames the regimes for creating conditions that give rise to terrorism by repressing and enraging their populations. “There is something wrong with Saudi Arabia’s citing U.S. support for Israel as the root cause for this Islamist terror,” when, he argues “...the Saudi regime has tolerated the harsh Islamist movements that provided ideological guidance for these young men, when Saudi Arabia was the biggest funder of the Taliban, when the Saudi ruling family has alienated some of its most devout subjects to a degree that produced Islamist militancy, and when the Saudi regime...winked at indirect fund-raising for Mr. Bin Laden in the kingdom as a way of currying favor with its hard-line Islamist critics.”¹³

Friedman also argues that the terrorists are not angry about U.S. policies, but are jealous of our way of life. He says that, while the United States has made mistakes that make people angry, “there really are people who hate us for who we are, not just for what we do.”¹⁴ He blames the drift of many young men toward extremism on the failure of Arab regimes to modernize their economies and educational systems, leading to unemployment and despair among the burgeoning youth population.¹⁵ “Arab regimes fail to build a real future for their people. This triggers seething anger. Their young people who can get visas escape overseas. Those who can’t turn to the mosque and Islam to protest. The regimes crush the violent Muslim protesters, but to avoid being accused of being anti-Muslim, the regimes give money and free rein to their most hard-line, but non-violent, Muslim clerics, while also redirecting their publics’ anger onto America through their press.”¹⁶

Friedman also sees the experience of those who migrate to Europe as a context that leads some to anti-Western terrorism. He points to the fact that many of the hijackers and others arrested for terrorism were radicalized by the social dislocation they experienced in first growing up in a world which did nothing to prepare them for modern life, and then moving to Europe, where they did not fit in, and where they gravitated toward radical Islam. “What radicalized the September 11 terrorists was not that they suffered from a poverty of food, it was

that they suffered from a poverty of dignity.¹⁷ Friedman argues that the U.S. must pressure Arab regimes to change, and has argued in favor of a U.S. war against Iraq in part so that we can install a democracy that will serve as a liberating example to the region.¹⁸

Friedman sees anti-Americanism coming in part from U.S. policies. He notes that many observers express the fear that increased democracy in the region could undermine the pro-U.S. and relatively modernist regimes in place. He argues, however, that “the pro-Americanism of these Arab leaders is being bought at a price of keeping their own people so angry, so without voice, and so frustrated by corruption that they are enraged at both their regimes and us.”¹⁹ He sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not as a *source* of terrorism, but as a serious issue which, left unresolved, has distracted many in the Middle East from the serious economic, political and social problems their countries face. “Many Arabs and Muslims now passively back bin Laden to express their rage at U.S. support for Israel and repressive Arab regimes.”²⁰ He argues for greater U.S. pressure on Israel to stop unhelpful actions in the Palestinian territories, such as continued growth of settlements.²¹

Fareed Zakaria, a Newsweek columnist, believes Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism have their sources in a mix of disappointment with the promises of modernization, and a “dangerous game” that the Saudi regime has played to “deflect attention from its shoddy record at home.”²² He argues specifically that the region’s “culture does not condone terrorism but fuels the fanaticism that is at its heart.”²³ He criticizes Arab regimes for failing to bring their countries successfully into the modern world, but also says that Arabs have become disillusioned with the Western world because they do not see efforts at modernization (or Westernization) as having brought them any benefit. “Fundamentalism gave Arabs who were dissatisfied with their lot a powerful language of opposition.”²⁴

A year after the September 11 attacks, however, Zakaria argued that, while there is anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, there is not great support for extremist movements such as Al Qaeda, noting that “Ever since that terrible day in September 2001, we have all been watching, waiting and listening for the angry voice of Islamic fundamentalism to rip through the Arab and Islamic world. But instead there has been...silence.” (elipses in original)²⁵ “This doesn’t mean,” he says, “that people in the Middle East are happy with their regimes or approve of American foreign policy, or that they have come to accept Israel.” But, he argues, they are not looking to Islamic fundamentalism as a solution. He notes that there are serious problems in the Islamic world which deserve our attention, and that the terrorist groups still pose a threat. He sees hope for reform in the Arab world and calls upon moderate Muslims to take the lead. “If these

problems are addressed—if its regimes become less repressive, if they reform their economies—the region will, over time, stop breeding terrorists and fanatics.²⁶

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has posted on its website in question-and-answer format an extensive effort to explain the September 11 attacks.²⁷ The website examines a list of possible causes and provides conclusions about the relative importance of each as a source of the terrorist attacks. It cites religious extremism as a motivating factor, noting Al Qaeda's stated goal of creating an Islamic state and driving the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia in particular and the Middle East in general. It also notes that "The extremists also have accused the United States of supporting authoritarian governments in the Middle East while promoting democracy elsewhere, of helping oppress the Palestinians by backing Israel, and of killing what they claim are millions of Iraqis through U.N. economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein." The CFR cites anger over the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. support for repressive regimes, stating that "Experts say support for corrupt autocrats is a leading cause of anti-Americanism in the Arab world." It sees sanctions on Iraq not as a "cause of September 11," but as a "wellspring of anti-Americanism in the Middle East." Similarly, CFR sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not as a cause of the September 11 attacks, but as a source of antipathy toward the U.S. in the Arab world, and concludes that "The Bush administration will find it harder to win support in the Arab world for continued moves against al-Qaeda and future steps against Iraq if its effort take place against a backdrop of Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed." Like many individual observers, the CFR report sees the origins of the extremist groups in the political context of the region.²⁸

OPINION POLLS

The insights of these observers help shed light on historical and present day trends in the Arab and Muslim world, but their conclusions have not been rigorously tested against broad research into opinions in the region. Three major opinion polls taken during 2002 provide rich food for thought in the effort to understand the depth and the sources of anti-Americanism in the region, strength, and the importance of that sentiment relative to other regions in the world. These polls shed some light on the link between those sentiments and terrorism, and have some implications for U.S. policy in the region.

Zogby International and the Arab Thought Foundation (based in Beirut, Lebanon), conducted an eight-nation poll of 3,800 Arabs living in Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Egypt and Israel in March and April 2002. It did not screen for religion or nationality.²⁹ Among its key questions, the poll asked respondents to rank a list of

issues in order of personal importance (ranging from health care to marriage to political issues), a list of values children should be taught, and a list of political issues. Pollsters also asked respondents whether they were better or worse off than they had been four years ago, than they thought they would be in four years, than their parents had been at their age, and than their children would be. They were also asked whether they thought favorably or unfavorably of a list of non-Arab countries, including the United States, and were asked an open-ended question about how the United States could improve its image in the Arab world. In its summaries and press presentation, Zogby focused on the fact that the respondents, like people all over the world, generally ranked personal issues higher than political issues, that they ranked concern over Palestinian issues relatively high, and that they professed to be relatively optimistic about the future.

The Gallup Organization surveyed 10,000 individuals in nine predominantly Muslim countries for its 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World. In the introduction to the Poll report, Richard Burkholder, Gallup's Director of International Public Opinion Research, said the organization wanted to gauge the depth of resentment toward the United States in the Muslim world and gain some sense of attitudes toward Islamic fundamentalists.³⁰ The survey was conducted in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Like the Zogby poll, Gallup did not screen for citizenship or religion.³¹ Gallup asked respondents whether they thought Western values had a positive or negative impact on their cultures, whether they had a favorable or unfavorable view of the United States, and about the factors that influenced their view of the United States. It asked respondents whether they thought Arabs had conducted the September 11 attacks and whether they believed the attacks morally justifiable. Gallup also asked about cultural values, including values respondents thought most important to teach to children, and whether respondents were optimistic or pessimistic about the future. Gallup launched the report with a major press roll-out. Newspapers such as USA Today which covered the poll highlighted the fact that large majorities of respondents did not believe that Arabs had been responsible for the September 11 attacks.³² At least one commentator criticized Gallup for sensationalizing the number of respondents who expressed unfavorable views of the United States, and for failing to distinguish between citizens and residents of countries such as Kuwait, where non-Kuwaiti guest workers make up more than half the population.³³

The Pew Research Center for The People & The Press conducted a much broader poll of opinion around the world. "What the World Thinks in 2002," issued December 4, 2002 under the auspices of The Pew Global Attitudes Project, reports the results of a survey of 38,000

people in 44 countries in every region of the world.³⁴ In its press release of the report, Pew said that the image of the U.S has been “tarnished” around the world since the September 11 attacks, but that opinions about the U.S. are “complicated and contradictory.”³⁵ The Pew survey asked respondents whether they had a favorable or unfavorable view of the United States, whether they thought the United States takes their country’s interests into account in formulating foreign policy, whether they supported the United States’ goals in the war on terrorism, and whether they admired various aspects of American culture. The survey asked respondents about their quality of life and outlook for the future. It also asked their level of satisfaction with their state of their country, how well their government was handling their countries problems, and which problems among a list of ten provided were of greatest concern in their country.

The Pew survey showed high levels of negative sentiment against the United States around the world, particularly in the Middle East, and some negative attitudes about aspects of U.S. culture in every region, including among residents of some close American allies. It showed opposition to the U.S.-led war on terrorism in most of the predominantly-Muslim countries surveyed, and showed that most respondents around the world, including Western Europe and the Middle East, but also in Canada and other friendly countries, believe the United States “does not take into account the interests of [the respondent’s] country when making international policies.”³⁶

One difficulty in drawing conclusions from the polls is censorship. Each of the polls’ authors made clear that in certain countries the pollsters had to clear questions with governments. While he did not refer directly to censorship, in his note on methodology, Zogby stated that opinion polling was not well-developed in the Arab world, but added “Progress is being made. We even found a greater willingness on the part of the government authorities to support more inquiry into these topics.”³⁷

Gallup and Pew specified that certain governments had prevented them from asking certain questions. Gallup noted that the idea of poll-taking in the region is difficult in part because of censorship. It cleared the poll questions with local officials, and made “minor adjustments” when local officials so requested. The report introduction states that Gallup’s Middle Eastern research partners “knew it would be impossible to address the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks directly—in a region where speech tends to be more heavily regulated, local governments would never allow such questions to be asked outright.” Gallup’s questions about September 11 were limited and they were not permitted to ask these questions or questions about U.S. actions in Afghanistan in Jordan and Egypt.³⁸ Gallup further noted that it phrased its questions in ways that would be most likely to pass the censors. Its questions “focused on the

respondents' worldview," and so it was "...able to couch indirect questions about terrorism and the West in a more innocuous context."³⁹ The Pew Trust noted that "In some countries, official government permission needed to be granted in order to proceed and, in some cases, certain questions could not be asked. We did not alter the questionnaire to gain permission, but were required to omit a significant number of questions in China, Vietnam, and Egypt." The excluded questions included those asking about satisfaction with the performance of the government and whether or not the respondent approved of suicide bombing.⁴⁰

U.S. VIEWED UNFAVORABLY IN ARAB/MUSLIM WORLD—AND ELSEWHERE

One clear theme in each of the polls is that respondents in Arab and Muslim countries expressed intensely unfavorable views of the United States, but somewhat better opinions of other aspects of American culture. Each poll used different methods and questions, but the results were resoundingly unfavorable for the United States.

In the Zogby poll respondents were provided a list of 13 non-Arab countries and asked whether they had a "favorable" or "unfavorable" overall view of each country. The U.S. was viewed favorably by 11% of United Arab Emirates (UAE) respondents, 12% of Saudis, 15% of Egyptians, 16% of Israeli Arabs, 26% of Lebanese, 34% of Jordanians, 38% of Moroccans, and 41% of Kuwaitis. Israel received an overwhelmingly unfavorable score. Two to five percent of the respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE view Israel favorably; while eight percent did in Morocco and Egypt. Sixteen percent of Israeli Arabs had an overall favorable view of their country. Favorable/unfavorable ratings for the United Kingdom were similar to those for the United States. Other Western countries, including Germany, Canada, and France had much more positive ratings.⁴¹

Zogby concluded that "Clearly the responses in this section point to an Arab concern with the United States and Israel. It is not, as some might hasten to construe, an anti-Western sentiment at work, since France and Canada, both Western countries, are among the countries receiving the highest favorability ratings. Germany also receives strong positive scores from most Arab respondents."⁴²

The Gallup Poll also registered significant numbers of respondents who said they had a "mostly" or "very" unfavorable view of the United States. Lebanese respondents were evenly divided with 41% having a favorable view of the U.S., 40% negative, and 19% saying "neither." In Turkey the numbers were 40% favorable, 33% unfavorable, and 25% neither. Kuwait respondents had a 28% favorable, 41% unfavorable, and 31% neither response. In Jordan, only 22% had a favorable view, with 62% having an unfavorable view, and 16% saying "neither."

Numbers were similar in Morocco, with 22% having a favorable view, 41% unfavorable, and 19% saying “neither.” In Saudi Arabia, only 16% had a favorable view, 64% unfavorable, and 19% said “neither.” Numbers were almost identical in Iran, with 14% having a favorable view, 63% unfavorable, and 14% saying “neither.” Pakistan was the lowest, with only nine percent having a favorable view, 68% unfavorable, and 23% saying “neither.”⁴³

Gallup also asked respondents about their views of “the West” in general, asking “How positively or negatively do you think our own value system is being influenced by the value system that prevails in the Western societies?” In several countries, a majority (Saudi Arabia (53%), Lebanon (62%), Morocco (67%), and Jordan (74%)) said Western societies had a “somewhat” or “very” negative influence on their own culture. In the other countries less than half saw the influence as negative, but in no country did more than 26% (this in Kuwait) see the influence as “somewhat” or “very” positive. Many respondents said the influence was “neither.”⁴⁴

The Pew poll shows how attitudes toward the United States in the Arab and Islamic world compare with attitudes elsewhere. “The United States and its people are looked upon favorably by much of the world, despite substantial concern over U.S. international policies, its business practices and even its ideas about democracy. The United States is rated favorably by majorities in 35 of the 42 countries where the question was asked. But the U.S. is viewed only *somewhat* favorably in virtually all of these countries. Moreover, negative opinions of the U.S. have increased in most of the nations where trend benchmarks are available. Opinion of the U.S. varies greatly around the world... Negative opinion of the U.S. is most prevalent in the Middle East/Conflict Area, but by no means is it confined to those countries. Roughly half of Argentines look upon the United States unfavorably, as do sizable minorities in countries ranging from the Slovak Republic to South Korea.”⁴⁵

Except for the consistently negative rating in the Middle East, clear patterns were hard to establish around the world. Over eighty percent of respondents in several countries around the world (Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Guatemala, Venezuela, Honduras, Philippines, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya) gave the U.S. a positive rating. Favorable ratings for the U.S. ranged from six percent in Egypt to 35% in Lebanon. (Other favorable ratings were Pakistan (10%), Jordan (25%), and Turkey (30%).) The highest rating (excluding Uzbekistan) is lower than the lowest rating for any other country except Argentina, where only 34% had a favorable view of the U.S. The numbers rating the United States unfavorably were similarly high in the Middle East, again except for Uzbekistan. Majorities throughout the region ranging from 55% in Turkey to 75% in Jordan said they had an unfavorable view of the United States. (Other unfavorable ratings were Pakistan

(69%), and Lebanon (59%)). No country in any other region registered more than 50% unfavorable. (Argentina was 49%).⁴⁶ By contrast, favorable rates throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including some of the poorest countries in the world, were all above 53%, and mostly above 74%. Unfavorable rates in Africa were all below 30%, except in Senegal, where they were 37%. These attitudes compare with those in Western Europe and Canada, and are more favorable than in most countries in Latin America. The texture of anti-Americanism gets more complicated when one looks at South Korea, a close American ally, where only 53% expressed a favorable attitude toward the U.S., and 44% a negative attitude.⁴⁷

Pew saw U.S. actions around the world as critical.⁴⁸ While respondents in Egypt and Turkey felt overwhelming (66% and 74% respectively) that the U.S. does not take the views of their countries into consideration when formulating international policy, these numbers are virtually identical to those in Canada, South Korea, and France.⁴⁹ The Pew report concluded that, "In general, antipathy toward the U.S. is shaped more by what it *does* in the international arena than by what it *stands for* politically and economically. In particular, the U.S.'s perceived unilateral approach to international problems and the U.S. war on terror play large roles in shaping opinion toward the U.S. Those who think the U.S. does not take their country's interests into account when making international policy and those who oppose the U.S.-led war on terror are much more likely than others to have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S. This is particularly true in the Middle East/Conflict Area, Eastern Europe and Latin America."⁵⁰

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICANS

All three polls tried to test whether there was any difference in respondents' attitudes toward Americans versus the United States, with mixed results. In the case of the Zogby and Pew surveys, the poll reports made reference to previous polling data to buttress their conclusions.

Zogby noted that he "found in an earlier study conducted by Zogby International in April of 2002, Arab unfavorable attitudes towards the United States are a function of U.S. policy toward the Arab world. In that study, entitled Impressions of America, we found that Arabs who were polled in five Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon and UAE) had strong favorable attitudes toward American "Science and Technology," "Freedom and Democracy," "Education," "movies and Television," and also had largely favorable attitudes toward the American people. However they had extremely negative attitudes toward U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Arab world, Iraq and most especially toward Palestine." Zogby's conclusion is that it Arab

anger is over U.S. policies and that there is not generalized hatred of the U.S. or American values.⁵¹

The Gallup Poll showed some mixed (and even somewhat contradictory) opinions about Western culture and aspects of Western society. Large majorities of respondents in every country said that “Western nations do not care about poorer nations, nor are they willing to share their technological knowledge with them,...that Western nations do not treat the minorities in their own countries fairly, and that Westerners have immoral lifestyles and weak family values.” Yet, respondents generally believed that “citizens of Western nations do have equal rights and duties,” and majorities in most countries expressed appreciation for Western films and music, and for Western “scientific and technological expertise,” and “political values and structures.”⁵²

The Pew Trust reported that “Historically, people around the world tend to have a more positive view of Americans than of the United States. But this distinction is fading, as respondents in only 13 of 43 countries surveyed expressed more positive attitudes about Americans than the U.S.”⁵³ Respondents in Jordan, Pakistan, and Egypt were among those who made a distinction, with 53% of Jordanian respondents having a favorable view of Americans (compared to 25% with a favorable view of the U.S.), 17% of Pakistanis having a favorable view of Americans (vice 10% with a favorable view of the U.S.) and 13% of Egyptians holding such a view (vice 6% with a favorable view of the U.S.).⁵⁴

“In general, respondents to the global survey are more critical of U.S. policies than they are of U.S. values. In nearly every country surveyed, at least a plurality blames differences their country has with the United States on policy disputes rather than on fundamental differences over values. Again, this is true even in the Middle East/Conflict Area.”⁵⁵ For example, except in Pakistan, respondents in the Middle East had a better impression of U.S. popular culture than of the U.S. overall, even though attitudes are more negative than in most other parts of the world.⁵⁶ The Middle East is more similar to the rest of the world in its assessment of U.S. business practices, which are viewed negatively almost everywhere.⁵⁷

Interestingly, there is also some dislike world-wide of “American ideas about democracy,” including in Canada and Western Europe as well as the Middle East, but not in many of the democratizing nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.⁵⁸ In fact, sub-Saharan African countries overall had the most favorable views about American ideas about democracy.”⁵⁹

PALESTINIAN QUESTION ONLY ONE FACTOR IN ANTI-AMERICAN VIEWS

Discerning the reasons for negative attitudes toward the United States in the Arab and Muslim world is difficult, but the Palestinian issue is clearly important. Respondents to the Zogby poll ranked Palestinian issues high (but generally not first) on a list of political issues of personal concern to them. Pollsters gave respondents a list of ten issues (Palestine, rights of Palestinians, civil/personal rights, general Arab situation, relations with non-Arab nations, health care, personal economic situation, economy of country, country able to meet new challenges, and moral standards) and asked them to rank the issues in order of personal importance to them. Cumulatively across the countries, civil and personal rights ranked number one, followed by health care and Palestinian issues. In every country except Saudi Arabia, civil and personal rights ranked number one or two. Palestinian issues were ranked first in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, ranked two or three in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, but only four among Israeli Arabs, five among Kuwaitis, and seven among Lebanese respondents.⁶⁰ The general Arab situation and relationship with non-Arab countries ranked consistently last.

Palestinian issues were more prominent in another question. When asked an open-ended question, "What can the United States do to improve its relations with the Arab world?" respondents raised issues related to Palestine generally more often than any other issue. A majority (54.4%) raised the issue in Lebanon. Palestinian issues were at the head of the list in Saudi Arabia (44%), UAE (30.6%--although almost as many, 30.5% raised "Relations with the Arab World as the top issue), and Morocco (32.9%). In Jordan, Palestinian issues topped the list, but only 24.1% of the respondents mentioned them, with 46.3% not specifying an issue. In Kuwait, 40.4% raised "relations with the Arab world" as a key issue, with only 29% raising Palestinian issues. For most countries, general issues of "relations with the Arab World" came second. Only small numbers of respondents raised issues related to Iraq, and this most frequently in Kuwait, where 2.9% of respondents said the United States should "remove Saddam Hussein from power, 1.5% asked for UN troops in Kuwait, and 0.9% asked that Kuwaiti prisoners be freed."⁶¹

The Gallup Poll discerned anger at the West regarding the Palestine issue. (It is important to note that the Gallup Poll asked about "the West" and not the United States.) Gallup asked respondents how closely and how frequently they followed news about the Palestinian situation, and then whether they thought the West dealt with the issue in an unbiased fashion, concluding "There is nothing ambiguous about perceptions of Western policy toward the Palestinians among the residents of the nine predominantly Islamic countries surveyed for Gallup's 2002 Islamic study."⁶² Gallup argued that the data could not definitively answer the

question of “How much does the Palestinian-Israeli conflict factor in fostering residents’ negative views of the West—and in particular, of the United States,” but that the study provides insights.

More than 80% of respondents in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Saudi Arabia said they had recently been following “news about Palestine” on the television. Far fewer respondents in the non-Arab countries, ranging from 16% in Indonesia to 41% in Turkey (and including 27% in Iran and 34% in Pakistan) said their attention had been attracted by TV news about the issue.⁶³

There was a similar distinction between Arab and non-Arab states in terms of the frequency with which respondents said they had followed the news about Palestine, with significant majorities in Turkey (62%), Pakistan (77%), Iran (77%), and Indonesia (92%) saying they followed the issue “hardly” or “not at all, while similarly large percentages of respondents in Arab countries said they followed the news about Palestine “very frequently.”⁶⁴

Overall, Gallup reported statistically significant increases in negative attitudes toward the United States according to respondents’ attentiveness to the Palestine issue. Gallup found that, except in Saudi Arabia, those who “pay very close attention to news about Palestine” were more likely to have “very unfavorable/somewhat unfavorable” opinion of the United States.⁶⁵ Gallup also found skepticism about the West’s fairness in dealing with the issue. The Gallup report stated that “rank-and-file citizens in the nine predominantly Islamic countries surveyed are skeptical about the neutrality of the Western world in its handling of the Palestinian conflict... In most of the nine countries, the statement ‘fair in their stance toward the situation in Palestine’ was the item least likely to be associated with the West.”⁶⁶

Gallup noted that all these responses show the importance of the Palestinian issue and “would suggest that the Palestinian issue is an important driver of negative attitudes toward the United States.” The Gallup Report goes on to say, however, that there is a similar correlation between negative views of the United States and the level of attention the respondent pays to events in Afghanistan, and concludes, “This would support the idea that the Islamic world has multiple grievances against the United States’ foreign policy toward the Arab/Islamic worlds that jointly contribute to negative attitudes toward the United States.”⁶⁷

IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONS ON SUPPORT FOR WAR ON TERRORISM

Only the Gallup and Pew surveys directly addressed the issue of the September 11 attacks or the war on terrorism, and both revealed lopsided opinions that indicate low U.S. credibility on these issues in the region. The conclusions do not say much about the sources of anti-Americanism, but do reveal a high level of mistrust. IN addition, the survey results do not provide insight into the sources of terrorism, but do reveal difficulties the U.S. has in convincing

residents of the Middle East (and some other regions) terrorism should be the top issue of concern.

The Gallup Poll asked two questions related to September 11. The first was, "According to news reports, groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the USA on September 11. Do you believe this to be true or not." In almost every country the majority answered that they believed it was "not true" that Arabs had carried out the attack. Eighty-nine percent of Kuwaitis, 86% of Pakistanis, 74% of Indonesians, 59% of Iranians, 58% of Lebanese, and 43% of Turks did not believe that Arabs had carried out the attack. (The Egyptian government did not allow the question.) It is interesting that respondents in Kuwait, which the U.S. has defended against Iraq, showed the highest level of disbelief; and that respondents in Lebanon and Iran, which are not considered as close "friends" with the U.S. had the lowest level of disbelief except for Turkey, a secular, non-Arab country. Gallup reported that, of those who ventured a suggestion as to who was responsible (and most did not), the most frequent answers were "(a) al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden, (2) the United States itself, (3) Israel, and (4) non-Muslim terrorists." (The report does note that "In Iran, the single most commonly volunteered perpetrator is the United States itself--either based on the view that the United States would attack itself in order to provide a pretext for subsequent actions against al Qaeda and international terrorism, or that the actions of the United States indirectly led to the attacks.")⁶⁸

Gallup also asked respondents whether they thought the September 11 attacks were "morally justifiable." Most respondents (ranging from 61% in Pakistan to 84% in Indonesia), except in Kuwait, found the September 11 attacks mostly or totally "morally unjustifiable."⁶⁹ In Kuwait only 36% found the attacks unjustifiable, while 36% said they were justifiable, and 26%, the highest level of non-respondents, said they were "neither." Unfortunately Gallup provided no insight into the relationship between the two questions. It would be useful, to see the correlation between those who believed Arabs were responsible for the attack and those who believe the attacks were justified.⁷⁰ What Gallup offers is tantalizing, but contributes little to understanding what link, if any, there is between generalized anti-Americanism and terrorism, except perhaps a tacit sense that grievances are strong enough to justify terrorism.

Pew asked respondents around the world whether they supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism. "There is broad support for the U.S. goal of combating terrorism, with the notable exception of those countries in the Middle East/Conflict Area. Yet there is an equally strong global consensus that the United States disregards the views of others in carrying out its foreign policy. In the Middle East, except in Uzbekistan, respondents opposed the war on terrorism and said they did not think the U.S. takes other countries into consideration in formulating policy."⁷¹

In Egypt and Jordan opposition to the war on terrorism ran high (79% and 85% respectively opposed it).

In other parts of the world, large majorities supported the war on terrorism, but believed the United States did not take other countries into consideration when formulating policy.⁷² For example, 68% of Canadians supported the war on terrorism, but 73% said they did not think U.S. foreign policy takes into consideration the views of others. Of all the West and East Europe countries, high majorities supported the war on terrorism, but only in Germany did a majority of respondents think the U.S. considered the views of others in formulating its foreign policy.⁷³ Support for the war on terror in Latin America was a bit more divided, but where anti-Americanism ran highest—in Argentina—support was lowest. South Koreans responded more like residents of the Middle East, with 72% saying they oppose the war on terror and 73% saying they do not think the U.S. takes the views of others into consideration when formulating foreign policy.⁷⁴ Even largely Muslim Indonesia and Bangladesh are not so opposed to the war on terror. In sub-Saharan Africa, majorities supported the war on terror except in predominantly Muslim Mali (where only 47% supported it) and Senegal (where only 32% supported it). Opinion in most countries was more divided than elsewhere about U.S. unilateralism, with majorities in six countries (Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, and South Africa) saying they believe the U.S. takes their country into consideration in foreign policy. “As is true in many other countries with sizable Muslim populations, Muslims in Nigeria and Senegal are less supportive than non-Muslims of the U.S.-led fight against terrorism.”⁷⁵

ANGER AT THEIR REGIMES OR JEALOUSY OF OUR SYSTEM

The polls provide some insight into the theories that anti-Americanism is fueled by widespread dissatisfaction in the region and jealousy of the United States. They provide less insight into respondents' attitudes toward their own regimes, especially given censorship of some questions in some countries. The polls do not provide any insight in whether these problems are at the source of terrorism originating from the region.

In the Zogby poll, respondents were asked to “state to personal importance of a number of political issues” (listed as “Palestine, the rights of the Palestinian people, ‘your civil and personal rights,’ the general Arab situation, relations with non-Arab countries, health care, personal economic situation, the economy of ‘your country,’ that ‘your country’ is changing to meet challenges, and moral standards.”⁷⁶ As Zogby notes, “without question, ‘civil and personal rights’ earned the overall highest priority rating given to any political issue.”⁷⁷ It ranked number one cumulatively, and ranked number one or two in every country except Saudi Arabia, where it

ranked number three. Unfortunately, Zogby did not further examine this result, stating only “The extremely high rating given to civil and personal rights speaks for itself.”⁷⁸

Pew was the only poll to ask respondents their opinions of national governments, and the responses do not set Middle Eastern countries apart from countries in other regions. Pollsters asked respondents to rate their national institutions. When asked to state which institutions (the military, the national government, the news media, and religious leaders) had a “good influence” on the country, many around the world ranked the military and the press very high.⁷⁹ (The question was not allowed in Egypt.) The responses in the Middle East correlated strongly with those in other regions, including the U.S. and Canada, but Pew warns that “People in countries with authoritarian regimes give their leaders...the high marks that might be expected for heads of governments that brook little opposition.”⁸⁰

For those analysts who see pessimism and despair as the source of anti-Americanism and especially of terrorism, the polls raise some questions. In the Zogby poll, pollsters asked respondents whether they were better off or worse off now than four years ago; whether they felt that four years from now their situation would be better or worse; whether they were better off today or worse off than their parents were at their age; and whether they felt that their children would be better off or worse off than they are. Zogby reports that the overall data shows that, except in Lebanon, “respondents indicate that they are more or less satisfied with their current situation and solidly optimistic about their longer-term prospects.”⁸¹ Regarding individual countries, the majority of respondents saw themselves better off now than four years ago in all except Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. Everywhere except in Lebanon and Israel respondents said they believed they would be better off in four years. In all but Lebanon and Saudi Arabia they saw themselves as better off than their parents were at the same age. In all but Lebanon most respondents said they believe that their children will be off than they are now.

The Gallup Poll had similar outcomes on a similar set of questions. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of one to ten with regard to how they rated their overall personal situation now, five years ago, and five years from now. In every country except Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, respondents felt they were better off now than five years ago, and in every country except Lebanon and Turkey, respondents believed they would be better off in five years than they are now.⁸²

The Pew Poll saw gloomier views of the world overall, but Middle Eastern respondents were no more pessimistic than counterparts around the world. Unlike the pattern in responses to questions about the United States, respondents in Middle Eastern countries did not stand out as significantly more pessimistic or critical than respondents in other regions of the world.

When asked whether they were satisfied with the state of their country, considerable majorities around the world, with few exceptions, responded that they were “dissatisfied.” The Pew report noted that “The more than 38,000 people interviewed in the *Global Attitudes* survey are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the way things are going in their countries today. Solid majorities in nearly every country in every region surveyed say they are unhappy with the state of their nation.”⁸³

In fact, responses in the “Middle East/Conflict Area” were an exception only in the high number of Uzbeks and Pakistanis (69% and 49% respectively) who stated they were “satisfied” with the state of their country. Respondents in the other Middle Eastern countries were very much in line with respondents in South America, East/Central Europe and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, with nearly all Lebanese and Turkish respondents (92% and 93% respectively) and 78% of Jordanians saying they were dissatisfied with the state of their country. Similarly high (over 75%) numbers were seen in much of the world. Respondents expressed less dissatisfaction in Western Europe and in more than half the sub-Saharan Africa countries surveyed.⁸⁴

There was a similar pattern in responses to a question about the state of the respondent’s national economic situation. Most respondents in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon saw their national economic situation as “bad,” but so did overwhelming numbers in Eastern Europe and Central America, in Germany, Indonesia, and Japan.⁸⁵

Pew provided further breakdown of their responses that linked the respondents economic situation with their attitudes about the United States. “In general, there is limited evidence to support the widely held view that poverty fuels discontent with the United States. This relationship is most apparent in Eastern Europe and the Middle East/Conflict Area. In these countries, people who are less well off economically are more likely than those who are more financially secure to dislike the U.S. Yet in Africa, Latin America and Asia, where poverty is widespread, the relationship between deprivation and anti-American sentiment is apparent in some countries but not others.”⁸⁶

U.S. POLICY

U.S. policy and policy-makers have occasionally responded directly to these polls, generally to say that they show that the United States needs to do more to spread the message about the United States and its policies in the region. For example, upon hearing the results of the Gallup Poll, President Bush responded “There is no question that we must do a better job of telling the compassionate side of the American story.”⁸⁷ Official policy acknowledges the importance of public diplomacy and projecting a positive image and several

official programs have been launched to promote better ties with the Arab and Muslim world. Starting immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Administration undertook a number of public diplomacy initiatives, especially with regard to the Arab and Muslim World. The Department of State brought on board Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, sought and received emergency funding for public diplomacy activities, sent Ambassador Chris Ross (an accomplished Arabic speaker) out to address Arab audiences on Al Jazeera, created an Arabic language radio station to reach Arab youth, and disseminated a number of products in several languages and media (print and electronic) to explain U.S. policies and goals.⁸⁸ But the bulk of U.S. effort has been toward defeating the terrorist groups themselves, rather than addressing the “sources” of terrorism, much less the sources of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world.

In its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued February 14, 2003, the White House outlined how it intended to defeat global terrorism.⁸⁹ The four part strategy would “**defeat** terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control and communications; material support; and finances,... **deny** further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists,... **diminish** the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk,... and **defend** the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad...”⁹⁰

The Strategy acknowledged the importance of examining the sources of terrorism both in describing the nature of the terrorist threat, and discussing how the U.S. will go about fighting terrorism. However, the language clearly saw “...underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife...” as “opportunities for terrorists to exploit,” rather than conditions that cause terrorism or sources of terrorism. “The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow.”⁹¹

In outlining the third goal—“Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit,” the Strategy states that “poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes... do not justify the use of terror.”⁹² The document denies a link to poverty, pointing out that the September 11 attacks were carried out by primarily middle class individuals and organized by a millionaire. It argues that “ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorists often

seek to manipulate for their own advantage. Additionally, diminishing these conditions requires the United States, with its friends and allies, to win the ‘war of ideas,’ to support democratic values, and to promote economic freedom.”⁹³

The specific objectives of the Strategy are to strengthen weak states, which “may become a sanctuary for terrorism.”⁹⁴ “We will continue to expand bilateral and multilateral efforts, such as the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, to promote good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and professionalization of local justice systems....Chiefs of Mission will support and report on U.S. and local efforts to diminish underlying conditions of terrorism and encourage all nations to implement anti-corruption measures pursuant to multilateral, regional, or bilateral agreements.”⁹⁵

With regard to public diplomacy, the Strategy says the United States will “wage a war of ideas to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit in areas most at risk, and to kindle hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.”⁹⁶ The United States “will seek to support moderate and modern governments, especially in the Muslim world. We will continue assuring Muslims that American values are not at odds with Islam.” The Strategy implicitly acknowledges that regional problems hinder the War on Terrorism, but makes no direct link between regional problems and terrorism. “Finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a critical component to winning the war of ideas. No other issue has so colored the perception of the United States in the Muslim world.”⁹⁷

Finally, the Strategy says that the United States “will use effective, timely public diplomacy and government supported media to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspiration for freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.”⁹⁸

The “Conclusion” provides a slightly nuanced discussion: “We will win the war of ideas and **diminish** the underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism.”⁹⁹ “We strive to build an international order where more countries and people are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners—values such as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free economies, and religious tolerance. We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism.”¹⁰⁰

Overall U.S. strategy, as presented in the National Security Strategy (NSS), is consistent with the themes in the terrorism strategy document. The NSS also explicitly denied the link between poverty and terrorism, stating that “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”¹⁰¹ Like the terrorism strategy, the NSS acknowledges the importance of addressing underlying conditions. “In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror.”¹⁰²

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT POLLS OFFER

The polls provide some useful information that can assist policy-makers in assessing the theories of regional experts about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism, but do not present as clear-cut an outlook as some would argue.

Whatever the source of anti-American sentiment, it is clearly a problem in the region, and should be of great concern. The clear concern about Palestinian issues may not be a source of either anti-Americanism or terrorism, but the fact that the situation remains unresolved and that the United States is widely perceived as biased will almost certainly impede efforts to build regional support for other key U.S. policy goals, including the war on terrorism. Some of these opinions may indicate the need for better public diplomacy to explain American actions, but it may be that the attitudes come from real differences of opinion over how to approach the situation, and frustration with the unresolved situation of Palestinians.

Secondly, policy makers should be concerned over doubts and disbelief about the identity of the September 11 terrorists and the lack of support in the region for the war on terrorism. These would seem to be symptoms of a greater problem—the lack of credibility of the United States in the region and the aggressively anti-American press in many countries, including some where the press is tightly controlled by the government. It would behoove policy makers to consider media campaigns by the United States to counter negative information from sources such as Hezbollah television, but also to test reactions to the way in which the United States explains its policies and outlooks to ensure that these are presented in ways that are convincing to non-Americans. The fact that there are negative attitudes, even in friendly countries such as Canada, toward several aspects of American life and toward how the United States conducts itself in the world makes this all the more important. As some experts have opined, it might also be necessary to keep up pressure on friendly governments to stop allowing their government controlled media to print obvious lies about the United States, and to allow

greater overall freedom of press so that residents of their countries have greater access to a full range of world opinion.

The polls provide less insight into searches for the sources of terrorism. As described above, none of the polls shows a level of pessimism or social dislocation or dissatisfaction described by regional experts and commentators ranging from Lewis to Friedman to Zakaria. The pessimism about global or national situations revealed in the polls is certainly not unique to the region, and there is no clear correlation between a country's level of development or social dislocation and anti-Americanism or terrorism. Part of this may be the fact that the polls did not (and maybe could not, given censorship) address directly attitudes toward terrorism (as opposed to attitudes toward the war on terrorism), but part of it may be that any analysis of the sources of terrorism, as opposed to the sources of anti-Americanism, may require a different approach, including analyses of the specific sources of discontent, the qualities of leadership, and the ideological goals of specific terrorist organizations.

The facts remain, however, that there is clearly strong sentiment against the United States in a region which generated a well-organized and financed terrorist organization which has targeted and successfully attacked the United States. If policy-makers are to convince people in the region that the problem is serious and that we need their help in defeating it, they must take a good look at the sources of anti-American sentiment, including those actions by the United States that inadvertently create mistrust, and devise a plan for overcoming these sentiments.

WORD COUNT = 11,012

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³⁶ Ibid., p. 4-5.

³⁷ Zogby, p. 99.

³⁸ Gallup Organization, p. 8.

³⁹ Gallup Organization, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Pew, p. 5, 73.

⁴¹ Zogby, p. 61.

⁴² Zogby, p. 63.

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⁴⁴ Gallup, p. 12.

⁴⁵ Pew, p. 53.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 53, 55.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 53, 55.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 70.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 69.

⁵¹ Zogby, p. 61-63.

⁵² Gallup, p. 12.

⁵³ Pew, p. 57.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 57.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 61.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 67.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 68.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 65.

- ⁶⁰ Zogby, p. 34.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 83-91.
- ⁶² Gallup, p. 12.
- ⁶³ Ibid., p. 16-17.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 16.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 15, 17.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 16.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 17.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 8.
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- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 8.
- ⁷¹ Pew, p. 58.
- ⁷² Ibid., p. 57.
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- ⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 60.
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- ⁷⁶ Zogby, p. 33.
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- ⁷⁹ Pew, p. 36.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 43.
- ⁸¹ Zogby, p. 44.
- ⁸² Gallup, p. 28.
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- ⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 56.

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⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 11-12.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹² Ibid., p. 22.

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⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 23

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

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¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 30.

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